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THE GREATER “TURKIC WORLD”—THAT IS, TURKEY AND THE MAJORITYof the Caucasus and Central Asia—has had deep connections tothe wider Islamic world ever since the Arab conquests nearly 1300years ago. Despite the region’s twentieth century history of Russianand Soviet imperial domination, the diverse peoples of Central
Asia and the Caucasus region (CAC) have remained thoroughly invested in their 
Islam ic identity.1 During the Soviet era, Islamic education persisted underground
in the predominately Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.2 Despite state-enforced atheism, reli-
gious teachers substituted formal Islamic institutions with privately run and very
often illegal educational organizations.3
The USSR’s sudden collapse in 1991 caused a fundamental rupture in the lives
of all nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus, particularly in their relationship
with Islam.4 For the ﬁrst time in generations, Muslims who had lived inside the
communist empire were free to form relationships with their co-religionists in
other countries, and thereby experience new religious and ideological trends. 
The Soviet-educated elites who dominated the newly independent republics 
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of the CAC were initially open to the idea of deepening their country’s links with
Muslim countries outside the region. However, despite the efforts of the CAC 
governments to continue to stiﬂe all politically troublesome religious organizations
and practices, the populations in these countries became increasingly exposed to
international Islamic and Islamist movements. Over the past two decades, new
contacts and mutual inﬂuences between CAC Muslims and Muslims from else-
where have proliferated. Various religious educational networks with roots in the
Middle East and South Asia have made inroads into the former Soviet Empire.
Such connections, combined with the greater numbers of CAC Muslims who have
been making pilgrimages to Mecca, has increasingly mixed their Islamic faith with
ideas from the Arab, Turkish, Persian and South Asian worlds.5
The collapse of the USSR has resulted in a broad-based Islamic Revival in 
post-Soviet countries as well as a growing competition between different Islamic
movements for inﬂuence in the CAC. Since many of these movements enjoy 
state support, including from Iran and Saudi Arabia, the religious competition
has also been deeply cultural and political. Turkish groups have been among the
most successful in the predominately Turkic countries of the CAC. This analysis
looks at the two most important Turkish trends in the CAC: the Diyanet and the
Hizmet movement, that is, the representatives of the Turkish State and the fol-
lowers of the very famous Turkish thinker and spiritual leader, Fethullah Gülen.
Turkey’s greatest inﬂuence among the Turkic populations of the post-Soviet world
derives not from their common ethno-linguistic roots, but from the success of
Turkey’s religious outreach. 
The Post-Soviet Islamic Revival
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MUSLIM POPULATIONS OF TURKEY, CENTRAL
Asia and the Caucasus have been highly ambiguous since the early years of 
post-Soviet independence. Two drivers have resulted in their realization. First and
foremost, the Turkish government sought to build strong relations with the new
Turkic republics as a result of Ankara’s ambition to form a greater Turkic politi-
cal union with the CAC rooted in a common ethno-linguistic heritage.6 Turkey’s
geopolitical goals and subsequent outreach facilitated the establishment of new
commercial relations between Anatolia and the CAC, thus encouraging greater
exchanges between civil and religious groups among the various Turkic countries.
Secondly, Turkish religious outreach in the CAC was secular and therefore did not
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challenge the West in its growing ideological competition with Islamism. Western
countries, including the United States, feared the spread of Islamic radicalism in
post-Soviet space, and thus encouraged Turkish groups to take an active role in
Central Asia to block the spread of Iranian and Saudi inﬂuence.7 Moreover, Cen-
tral Asian and Caucasian elites initially welcomed the growing Turkish inﬂuence8
as Western oﬃcials actively encouraged CAC governments to adopt the Turkish
model of secularism, democracy and market-oriented economic policies. Con-
se quently, the new CAC republics were generally welcoming of Turkish Islamic
groups and their schools. 
After the USSR collapsed, the public expression and exercise of Islam was 
no longer prohibited in the former Soviet Republics. Not only did the majority of 
people in the CAC practice traditional Islam, but the Islamic faith suddenly en-
joyed the strong backing of a variety of prominent institutions in the region.9 As
a result, the new governments sought to integrate faith into their new national
identities as they strove to co-opt the Islamic identity of their citizens. The peoples
of the CAC generally adhered in the past to the classical teachings of Suﬁsm, and
they came to see their traditions as a bulwark against extremism and radicalism.10
In Uzbekistan, the government renovated and publicly opened the mausoleum of
the great mystic, Bahauddin Nakshibend in Bukhara, founder of nakshibendiyya.
Meanwhile, in Turkmenistan, the new government renovated and transformed
the mausoleum of Najmeddin Kubra into a place of pilgrimage. In Kazakhstan,
the authorities publicly worshipped Ahmed Yassavi: the founder of the yasaviyya.11
In Azerbaijan, the new regime restored the holy places of Shia and Sunni Islam.12
Since the opening of Soviet borders in 1991, domestic political considerations
also compelled many Central Asian leaders to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and
Medina. 
At the same time, the new CAC regimes retained many Soviet-era governing
practices with respect to religion. Therefore, they closely monitored religious in-
tel lectuals and organizations for real and potential challenges to their political
power.13 As the Islamic Revival in CAC began to take off, regional governments
began intensifying their efforts to control religious practice and expression. The
religious revival, coupled with state repression, manifested itself in destructive
ways.14 Such is evident in the founding of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) in 1993. The emergence of the IMU marked the start of a new era in radi-
cal Islam in the CAC. The IMU began as a fringe movement with little inﬂuence
in wider Uzbek society. After experiencing brutal repression at the hands of the
Uzbek government, the IMU established a base of operations in neighboring
Tajikistan from where it staged a string of attacks against its home country.15
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In the late 1990s, the resulting diffusion of radical Islamism into Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, coupled with the insidious inﬂuence of the Taliban in Afghan istan,
prompted regional governments to adopt increasingly repressive religious poli-
cies. The fear of collusion between grassroots CAC radical Islamist movements
and the Taliban proved justiﬁed, as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan began coordinating their operations in the
late 1990s.16 In response to this new jihadist threat, Central Asian regimes have
generally adopted more authoritarian policies toward religion. In addition to the
real threat of jihadism, the prevailing assumption of ruling elites across the CAC
has been that any Islamic phenomenon is potentially radical. In practice, both
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have generally been more liberal in their domestic
policies toward Islam than the other CAC polities. In Azerbaijan, for instance, the
new state has progressively reinforced its control of Islamic practice and expres-
sion, fearing that an absence of control would pave the way for the development
of a strong Iranian Shia inﬂuence in the country.17 Similarly, in Uzbekistan au-
thor ities have adopted notoriously aggressive and intrusive policies towards Islam
to prevent any Islamist movement from taking root in the country. In the 1990s,
when Jama’at al Tabligh representatives came to Uzbekistan from South Asia,
they were immediately expelled from the country. 
Throughout the CAC, the state exerts control over religion through two institu-
tions: the Directorate of Spiritual and Religious Affairs and the State Committee
for Religious Affairs. The state’s oﬃcial Islamic scholar, the Mufti of the re public,
leads the Directorate of Spiritual and Religious Affairs. He in turn, manages the
state’s guidelines for Islamic practice, appoints imams, oversees the restoration of
mosques, schedules prayers, and so forth.18 Upon obtaining independence, each
CAC country also established a State Committee for Religious Affairs. The role of
these committees, which are run by state-appointed technocrats who often have
little to no religious training, is to monitor religious organizations and ensure they
comply with state law and standards of political correctness. Together, these two
governmental bodies are responsible for monitoring and shaping the evolution
of Islam in the CAC. They set the standards for acceptable literature, religious dis-
course and leadership training from abroad. They alone have the power to vali-
date (or reject) the activities of religious organizations, and they have the ultimate
power to decide which organizations and which countries are allowed to operate
in the CAC. Of all the foreign countries and movements that are conducting reli-
gious outreach in the region, Turkey is the one that is most preferred by CAC 
governments. 
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Turkish Outreach in the CAC
T H E D I R E C T O R AT E O F R E L I G I O U S A F FA I R S , D I YA N E T I S L E R I B A S K A N L I G I
(more commonly known as Diyanet), is a testament to the complexity and ambi-
guity of the relations between the state and religion in Turkey.19 The Diyanet is a
distinctive creature of the Turkish republican system. It was established to man-
age the relationship between the Kemalist state and Islam, and it thus oversees the
operation of mosques and religious education in Turkey. As a religious organiza-
tion, the Diyanet’s compatibility with secularism, the founding ideology of the
modern Kemalist state, has been the subject of intense controversy in the past.20
While it has been very active in Turkish domestic politics, the Diyanet has also
been involved in foreign countries since well before the Soviet collapse. Through-
out the 1980s, the Diyanet sent imams and provided other religious services to
Turkish expatriates across Europe. 
In Turkish embassies and consulates abroad, Diyanet oﬃcers served as reli-
gious affairs attachés who assisted and also monitored Turkish expatriates.21 In
the past, the Diyanet rarely cooperated with other Sunni Islamic states, namely
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, except on very speciﬁc issues such as facilitating Turk-
ish citizens’ pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina or their occasional enrollment at
Cairo’s prestigious al-Azhar University. After the fall of the Eastern bloc, however,
the Diyanet became directly involved in the formerly Ottoman regions of the
Balkans and in the wider Turkic world of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Con-
sequently, the Diyanet suddenly became a core instrument of Turkish political 
inﬂuence throughout the former Soviet Union, and especially in the ethnically
and culturally Turkic republics. 
All this begs the question: why has the Diyanet—an institution originally 
established to manage the thorny relations between Islam and the Kemalist state
inside Turkey—become so integral to Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet
CAC? The answer is simple: geopolitics. In the early 1990s, Turkish elites felt
strongly that the Turkic areas of the former Soviet Union should not fall under
the inﬂuence of regional competitors such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. Indeed, many
Turks feared that the new republics would look elsewhere for authoritative sources
of Muslim identity. For fear of losing inﬂuence in the CAC, Turkey’s capacity for
religious outreach became a strategic asset. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was the
ﬁrst modern Turkish leader to recognize the potential strategic signiﬁcance of
Turkish Islam in the CAC. In recent years, the AK Party (AKP) and its leaders
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Recep Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu have redoubled Turkey’s international 
religious outreach to the wider Turkish world. 
The Turkish government’s religious outreach into the CAC formally began in
1994 with the founding of the Eurasian Islamic Council, Avrasya Islam S.urası.
The organization answers directly to the Diyanet and has brought 32 Spiritual
Affairs Boards from the CAC, the Balkans, and the autonomous republics inside
Russia together.22 The council’s purpose is to facilitate dialogue about the proper
relationship between Islam and the state and the role of Islam in society. Over the
course of eight summits held since 1995, the council has had some success in
reaching agreements among participants on a range of issues, including the dates
of major Muslim holidays, the structure and curriculum of Islamic education, and
the promotion of the unique Islamic heritage, spiritual leaders, and ideas of the
greater Turkish world. Thus it has allowed Turkey to convey its unique vision of
Islam to countries where it seeks to have political inﬂuence.23 This organization
has facilitated the expansion of Turkish inﬂuence, including in the Balkans and
the predominately Shiite though ethnically Turkish country of Azerbaijan. While
the Diyanet has generally made great gains in Central Asia, it has not been suc-
cessful everywhere—especially in Uzbekistan, where the government has become
increasingly resistant to religious cooperation with all foreign counties. 
Since the collapse of the USSR, the Turkish government has had a palpable
inﬂuence in reviving Turkish Islam in the Post-Soviet republics. Through the Di -
ya net, Turkey has been able to build or restore mosques in all of these countries.
Indeed, the Diyanet has built the largest mosques that attract the most fervent 
believers to Friday prayer in Baku and Ashkhabad. In all the Turkic-speaking coun-
tries except Uzbekistan, the Turkish Diyanet has aimed to educate new Islamic 
elites by establishing theology departments modeled on the prestigious faculty of 
theology at the University of Marmara. Central Asian and Caucasian students 
that the Diyanet admits into various theology schools are trained to serve their 
countries upon their return. Turkish imams are sent to these countries, albeit in
small numbers and often only in the month of Ramadan, to preach in mosques
in Central Asia and the Caucasus in cooperation with local religious leaders. 
Finally, extensive Islamic-based literature on the Prophet’s life, the essence of 
Islamic ethics and the history of Islam is printed in Turkey in all the pertinent lan-
guages and distributed for free throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
While the Turkish government has been especially inﬂuential, private organi-
zations not aﬃliated with Ankara have also been successful in spreading Turkish
religious teachings in the former Soviet Union. The primary movements are those
of the religious leaders Osman Nuri Topbaş,24 Suleyman Tunahan,25 Sait Nursi
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and Fethullah Gülen. Of these, the two who belong to the nakshibendiyya brother -
hood, Osman Nuri Topbaş and Suleyman Tunahan, are the most plain spoken
and adamant about the religious nature of their activities in Central Asia. The
two most inﬂuential movements, however, are the ones founded by the Suﬁ 
revivalist Sait Nursi and the contemporary spiritual leader Fethullah Gülen. 
Sait Nursi was born in 1876 near Erzurum in Eastern Turkey. He ﬁrst gained
notoriety through his military service on the Eastern Front against Russia during
World War I. An Islamist mystic, he subsequently became an inﬂuential religious
authority in his home province.26 When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created the Re-
public of Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, he founded the new
country on the basis of a secular ideology that respected Islam but aimed to limit
its political inﬂuence. Nursi, however, rejected Ataturk’s secular agenda, then 
renounced politics altogether after he realized an Islamic state wouldn’t be possi-
ble in the new republic. It was then that Nursi created what became known as the
Nurcu movement: a pietistic mystical campaign aimed at revitalizing people’s 
religious faith. As with many other modern revivalists, Nursi sought to remedy
what he saw as the “crisis of modernity” by showing that Islam and science were
compatible. He believed ﬁrmly that Islam needed to be taught in modern schools
and also that religious seminaries needed to open themselves up to the study of
the secular sciences. The movement organized reading circles devoted to the study
of Nursi’s core work, Risale i Nur (Letter of Light): an exegesis of the Quran that
explores Islamic spirituality. Through these study groups, Nursi’s teachings spread
and his movement grew rapidly underground.27 The movement’s inﬂuence in
Turkey undoubtedly had political implications; however Nursi remained focused
strictly on Islamic spiritualism and explaining the Quran and other basic Islamic
texts. 
When Sait Nursi died in 1960 he left behind an active and growing movement
in the country. His disciples divided the movement into several branches, each 
dedicated to a particular task. These included the dissemination of his masterpiece, 
Risale i Nur, the promotion of his ideas in academic circles, and the revival of 
Islamic education. Nursi’s most notable disciples are Mehmet Kutlular, Meh met 
Kirkinci, Mustafa Sungur, and the most inﬂuential of all, Fethullah Gülen. 
In the 1990s, Nurcu groups greatly enlarged their activities in the post-Soviet
Turkic republics. This new wave of Turkish religious outreach was the result of
unstructured private initiatives, not Ankara’s direction, and were devoted to
spreading the teachings of the Risale i Nur. While the book was originally written
in pre-Republican Turkish, it has since been translated into almost all of Central
Asia’s languages, including Russian. With the exception of Uzbekistan, the Nurcu
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movement is now active throughout all the Turkic former Soviet Republics. Their
presence in the CAC, however, is barely visible. They do not operate through oﬃ-
cial educational institutions, but through private and informal networks. For 
example, Nurcu reading circles are often organized by the many small and
medium-sized businesses led by Turkish expatriates in the CAC. Importantly, the
participants in these study groups do not even consider themselves to be part of
a coherent or recognizable religious movement. Such is evident in the fact that
they have never asked for oﬃcial recognition as a religious community from the
appropriate authorities in the countries where they operate. Today, their principal
goals in the CAC are to convey the Islamic ideas of Sait Nursi through study. It is
precisely on this issue that Fethullah Gülen’s movement, the most inﬂuential in
Central Asia, has distinguished itself from other Turkish movements. 
The Fethullah Gülen Community 
ALTHOUGH HE NEVER MET SAIT NURSI, FETHULLAH GÜLEN IS HIS MOST IN-
ﬂuential disciple. Gülen has distanced himself and the movement he created from 
classical Nursi teachings, however. Born in 1938 to a conservative family in East-
ern Turkey, Gülen followed Sait Nursi and devoted himself to educational reform.
While his ideas are rooted in Suﬁ mysticism, Gülen’s teachings have gradually 
come to focus on reforming civil society through Islamic spiritualism. The religious
movement that he founded has sought to train a new “gold” generation (Altin 
Nesil) that is both faithful to Islamic Turkish traditions and modern in its politi-
cal and economic outlook. Fethullah Gülen formed his ﬁrst group of disciples in
the 1960s when he worked as an imam for the State in Izmir.28 By the following
decade, the movement’s ideas had spread to other regions in Turkey. When Turkey
adopted a series of market-oriented reforms in 1980, a newly aﬄuent middle class
emerged that began to ﬁnancially support the Hizmet movement’s activities.Tur-
key’s economic growth, coupled with the deep Islamic faith of its people, enhanced
the popular appeal of the market-oriented religious movement.29 The subsequent
opening of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in 1989 allowed Gülen’s
followers to globalize their organization’s economic and religious activities. 
In Turkey and in the other countries, Gülen’s followers have become especially
inﬂuential in four areas of society. First the movement created an educational net-
work that now includes thousands of private institutions. The movement’s second
priority has been on media outlets. The Daily Zaman (and its English version,
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Today’s Zaman) is one of the most reputable journals in Turkey and has an in-
ternational audience.30 STV and several other television channels aﬃliated with
Hizmet also disseminate Fethullah Gülen’s ideas. The third priority area of the
Gülen movement is the intelligentsia. Its followers have sought to create forums
dedicated to inter-religious dialogue both in Turkey and abroad. Finally, the 
movement has been particularly active in trade and business. Consequently, the
movement is well ﬁnanced and thus able to sustain its educational, media, and
inter-faith activities. The businessmen who sympathize with Fethullah Gülen and
donate their time and money to Hizmet operate hundreds of large companies and
thousands of small- or medium-sized companies throughout Central Asia and the
Caucuses 
Initially, the Fethullahci deﬁned themselves simply as a cemaat (community) of
believers. Now they call themselves a hareket, or a more formally organized move-
ment. In recent years, many Fethullahci have begun to call the movement Hizmet
i.e. “the Service” as their activities have become more international. The move-
ment’s stated goal is to promote the ideals of dialogue, social peace and Civil Islam
on a global scale. To support this claim, the Hizmet movement highlights the 
interreligious meetings it organizes regularly in all the countries where it oper-
ates. It also supports initiatives in non-Muslim sectors with Christians, Jews and 
people of other faiths.31
For the Islamist rivals of the Hizmet movement, Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives
are corrupt, if not evil. They have an apolitical agenda, they promote civil society,
and they cooperate with secular Muslims and the West. Stated bluntly, they be-
lieve the movement enables the “enemies of Islam.” They believe Gülen’s moder-
ate movement saps Islam of its ﬁghting spirit and thus perpetuates the submission
of the Muslim world to the West. The fundamentalist Turkish movement of Cema -
 lettin Kaplan, for example, deems the Gülen movement insuﬃciently Islamic. 
In Turkey, some secularist and Kemalist elements (including Army leaders, and
the Republican People’s Party—CHP), as well as some Western analysts,32 are 
convinced that Gülen and his followers actually have a hidden agenda to foster the
emergence of a new Islamic political order. Such assertions are not entirely inac-
curate. The Hizmet movement undoubtedly spreads a human istic and civic-
minded spirit that, unlike Islamists, hasn’t demonstrated overt hostility to modern
secular democracy per se. Some of the claims by secularists that the Fethullahci
have a political agenda are still valid, however. The Hizmet movement is, in fact,
much more than a strictly religious phenomenon insofar as it shows how Islam,
engagement in international markets and secular civic life are compatible. There-
fore, the movement’s growing inﬂuence in the CAC poses a political challenge to
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the current regional political order which is still deeply inﬂuenced by the Soviet
legacy of authoritarianism and statist economics. 
The Hizmet movement and the manner in which it functions has interesting
parallels with the Jesuit congregation. Indeed, the structure and dispensation of
the movement owes some of it inspiration to the Western missionary schools es-
tablished in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire. Gülen ingeniously adopted
the Jesuit practice of active proselytization for the purposes of educating a new
generation of modern Turkish and other Muslims.33 Much like the Jesuits before
them, the Fethullahci have developed a program of “total” education, which in-
cluded not just classroom study but also provided dormitory housing and weekend
activities for many of its students.34
Today, the Hizmet movement is active in 150 countries. Much like in Turkey,
the movement’s educational and civil society initiatives in foreign countries 
are aimed at educating a new Muslim middle class that is faithful to Islam and
modern in its economic-political outlook. The greater post-Soviet Turkish world
had been the testing grounds for the movement’s initial international forays. 
Now, through its extensive networks in the CAC, the movement provides a secu-
lar education that is of an unmatched quality in all post-Soviet societies. From 
Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan, Hizmet has established schools and universities that 
provide a modern and secular education that appeals directly to the real needs
and aspirations of entire populations. Given the poverty, social confusion and 
political chaos of the CAC following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it is not surpris-
ing that the people in the region initially responded very favorably to the Hizmet
movement’s outreach. Undoubtedly, the good reputation of Hizmet schools has 
legitimized and facilitated its growing inﬂuence in these countries.
When they ﬁrst began to establish themselves in the greater Turkish world,
Hizmet representatives did not explicitly identify themselves or their schools as 
religious or, for that matter, as aﬃliated with Fethullah Gülen. The ﬁrst Hizmet
representatives to arrive in Central Asia in the 1990s were businessmen and entre -
preneurs. The schools they built appeared to be a part of Turkey’s larger efforts to
re-establish civil connections with the new Turkish republics of the CAC. At the
time, Turkey’s Kemalist elites were suspicious of the Hizmet movement; however,
the most powerful ﬁgure in Turkish politics, President Turgut Ozal, was a strong
supporter of Fethullah Gülen. Moreover, the ﬂedgling Central Asian and Cauca -
sian governments were also very open to and supportive of Hizmet’s growing 
involvements in their own countries. These governments did not see the move-
ment as religiously motivated, but simply as an outgrowth of the Pan Turkish
movement. As a result, many populations were generally grateful for Hizmet’s
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growing presence since they considered it to be assistance from Turkey, which
they regard as the “Big Brother.” 
The educational institutions that Hizmet founded in the CAC were mainly high
schools and universities.35 In Azerbaijan, there is still one Hizmet-aﬃliated univer -
 sity, Kafkas University, at least 12 high schools, and dozens of small tutoring cen-
ters that offer modern and secular education under the auspices of the Ministry
of Education. In Kazakhstan, a country of 17 million, there are 28 high schools
and one university: the University of Süleyman Demirel. A private company estab -
lished and owned by members of the Hizmet movement, Katev, manages all of
these educational institutions. Private Turkish businessmen and educators who
follow Fethullah Gülen have also established ﬁfteen high schools and one univer -
sity, Ala Taoo, in Kyrgyzstan and six schools in Tajikistan. 
In 2000, there were more than ﬁfteen movement-aﬃliated high schools in
Uzbekistan. In 2001, however, Uzbek authorities shut them all down because
diplomatic relations between Tashkent and Ankara had deteriorated. Even in
Uzbekistan, however, many in the government and in the general population had
very positive attitudes towards the Hizmet schools when they had ﬁrst arrived.
Tashkent shut down all the schools because of its ongoing political feud with
Turkey, not because Tashkent was suspicious about the cemaat’s activities.36 In
fact, the Uzbek government shut down public schools that had been sponsored by
the Turkish state much earlier than the privately run Hizmet aﬃliated schools.
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. and subsequent NATO invasion
of Afghanistan led the CAC governments to tighten their grip over religious 
affairs in their countries. Consequently, the reach of Islamist movements has con-
tracted throughout the region.37 Nevertheless, the good reputation of the Hizmet
schools has largely remained intact. This is partly because Hizmet schools and
businesses are still not widely regarded as religious in nature, but as “Turkish
schools” simply. Moreover, in the post-9/11 era, the Hizmet movement has also
adopted a new public relations strategy: it has emphasized interfaith dialogue 
and has become expressly anti-Islamist. Since 2001, Fethullah Gülen’s followers
have begun to openly display their commitment to their spiritual leader, but they
have presented him more as an intellectual and civic leader than as a religious 
authority. Gülen’s publications, which had largely been unseen before 2001, 
now appear in the movement’s schools all over Central Asia. These publications 
highlight Gülen’s assorted efforts to promote peace, to support dialogue between 
religions, and to foster tolerance and moderate religious beliefs among Muslims.
Fethullah Gülen himself published a considerable number of books and articles
after 9/11 that denounced all forms of violence perpetrated in the name of Islam.38
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His moderate speech and the movement’s efforts to promote dialogue distin-
guished Hiz met from other Islamic movements in Central Asia. At the same time,
the movement’s schools in the greater Turkic world have all continued to downplay
their religious underpinnings. In fact, as anti-religious sentiment among elites has
visibly grown in the CAC region, and government control over religious affairs has
often grown more repressive, the Hizmet movement has taken signiﬁcant steps 
to make itself more transparent and to publically re-aﬃrm its secular orientation.
Indeed, the priority of the movement’s schools continues to be the provision of a
modern and secular education that satisﬁes not just the desires and aspirations of
the region’s populations, but also the demands of governmental authorities. 
Growing Suspicions
THE HIZMET COMMUNITY HAS NEVER ADMITTED TO RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZATION
in Central Asian and Caucasian societies. Members of the movement in Central
Asia did, however, spread Gülen’s unique Islamic teachings through religious 
instruction and discipleship outside of their schools between 1990 and 1995.
These missionary efforts were clearly aimed at enlarging the Gülen-inspired 
religious society, the cemaat, into the greater Turkic world. But they did not last 
for long, however, because Gülen’s disciples realized early on that such religious
out-reach would fuel the mistrust of local authorities and potentially jeopardize
their educational and civic programs. The Hizmet representatives understood
that the people of the post-Soviet Turkic world appreciated their pragmatic, secu-
lar orientation more than their spiritual teachings. In time, movement represen-
tatives adopted a new strategy. Rather than spread their religious ideas through
dawa or tabligh (the conventional methods of preaching and spreading Islam),
they sought to spread their teachings by temsil, that is, by their personal example.
In practice, this method requires that the religious messenger lives Islam fully by
becoming morally upright, honest, and well-educated, and by behaving toward
others in a benevolent and virtuous way. The practice rests on the assumption
that people will be spontaneously drawn toward religious faith through the 
superior moral and civic example of the cemaat, rather than through the forceful
imposition of religion. 
In this way, temsil works as a kind of soft power. As a strategy for religious pros-
elytization, it has arguably been quite successful, as is evident in the rapid growth
of the Hizmet movement’s inﬂuence in the CAC region immediately after the
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USSR’s collapse. Fethullah Gülen’s followers, however, have since largely aban-
doned this strategy of subtle proselytizing “by example.” Across the post-Turkish
world, the cemaat has largely avoided speaking about religion. Indeed, they only
speak of their service to civil society, hizmet, and their commitments to education.
Even if the followers of Gülen in Central Asia and the Caucasus have a conserva-
tive, Muslim way of life, their outreach is not publically regarded as religiously
motivated. Indeed, there seems to be nothing in common between the Hizmet
movement’s civic activities and the expressly religious activities of the classical
Nurcu missionary groups, Suleyman Tunahan or the nakshibendis of Osman 
Nuri Topbaş. While these latter groups devote their efforts to the construction of
mosques, madrasas and the dissemination of Islamic literature, members of the
Hizmet movement prefer to keep their Islamic faith discreet.
Despite the movement’s non religious reputation and the good standing of 
its schools, growing fears over Islamism in the CAC region since 2001 have 
cast greater suspicion on the movement and generated concerns that it has a 
hidden Islamist agenda. Anti-Gülen incidents ﬁrst took place in Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan, the predominately ethnically Turkish regions of Russia in the
Caucasus. Russian authorities banned Hizmet schools claiming that they broad-
cast Islam ism and pan-Turkism.39 Moscow’s actions have a tendency to reverber-
ate throughout the post-Soviet world. As a result, most Central Asian countries
have dramatically increased their surveillance of the movement’s activities in 
recent years. This sudden rise in anti-Gülen sentiment begs the question: why are
Eurasian leaders becoming skeptical now?
The rising anti-Hizmet sentiment in the CAC region appears to have less to do
with the movement’s activities in the region than they do with souring diplomatic
relations between CAC countries and Turkey. In Uzbekistan, Hizmet schools 
have been banished since 2001 because of the ongoing political crisis between
Tashkent and Ankara. In Turkmenistan, the government has only recently, in July
of 2011, decided to close some Hizmet schools. In Azerbaijan, where the image of
Turkey and the modern secularist “Turkish model” has been excellent for almost
twenty years, the government has signiﬁcantly strengthened its control over
Hizmet activities and its schools over the past two years.40
This sudden distrust of the Gülen movement in some CAC countries (this is
less pronounced in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) has resulted from developments
in Turkey, and principally, the rise to power of the Islam-oriented AK Party. The
ruling elites in the CAC region are still deeply secularist in their orientation, and
Soviet in their mindset. The political ascent of the AKP in 2002 shattered their
image of the secular Turkish model, and they interpreted this as a sign that the
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seemingly innocuous “Turkish schools” run by Gülen’s followers could surrep-
titiously be used to foster subversive Islamist ideas and political movements in
the CAC region. It is excessive to describe the AKP as a strictly Islamist party;
rather, it is more of a coalition that is comprised of Islamist elements and other re-
ligiously conservative groups, including a great number of the followers of Gülen.
However, the post-Soviet political elites in the Turkish world deemed the AKP’s 
religious conservatism “too Muslim.” As such, critics in CAC countries have seen
the rise of the AKP as a sign of the Hizmet movement’s gradual politicization in
Turkey, and cited this as evidence that the movement’s foreign outreach is not 
devoid of political and ideological ambitions. Moreover, the Ergenekon scandal 
of 2007, in which the AKP government arrested hundreds of military oﬃcers and
others on allegations of plotting to overthrow the government, was seen by many
in the CAC region as a sign that the Islamist government, Gülen’s followers in-
cluded, was settling accounts with the Kemalist “deep state” which had once bul-
lied them.41 Many, in fact, regard the AKP-led crackdown as politically motivated,
and as recent events have made clear, many innocent people have been punished
on the basis of unsubstantiated accusations. 
Despite the growing suspicions of the Hizmet movement because of its ties to
the AKP in Turkey, it has continued to subtly exert Turkish inﬂuence in many
parts of the CAC region. In important ways, this inﬂuence surpasses anything
that the oﬃcial outreach of the Turkish government has managed to achieve.
Three things must be noted about the Hizmet movement’s regional inﬂuence.
First, Gülen schools have allowed the Turkish language to be broadcast through-
out Eurasia. In the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat, for example, Turkish has be-
come the default language for many ethnic groups to communicate with one
another. Indeed, it is almost as prevalent as Russian and more common than Eng-
lish. Second, in the economic sphere, entrepreneurs aﬃliated with the movement
have created strong ties between Turkey and the countries of Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Perhaps most importantly, these business involvements have begun to
contribute to the emergence of a new, market-oriented and entrepreneurial cul-
ture in post-Soviet societies. Third, as the Gülen movement has become transna-
tional, it has allowed its members from Central Asia and the Caucasus to travel
around the world and participate in school competitions and international busi-
ness forums with people from other regions. This has exposed the CAC region to
new economic and political ideas, and helped to deepen its connections to the
wider world. The political fallout between the CAC and Turkey notwithstanding,
the activities of the Gülen cemaat in the CAC region have contributed signiﬁcantly
to the opening of the region to the wider world after the collapse of the USSR. 
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Turkish Islam and the 
CAC’s Future
TODAY, TURKEY’S INFLUENCE ACROSS THE GREATER TURKIC WORLD IS FAR LESS
than what the proponents of pan-Turkism had once hoped for following the 
Soviet Union’s collapse. Over the last two decades, Ankara’s efforts to create a
greater Turkic political union have generally faced resistance across the CAC 
region, and sometimes quite ﬁercely (as is the case with Uzbekistan.) But while
Turkey hasn’t gained much political inﬂuence, the country’s religious and cul-
tural inﬂuence in the CAC has grown signiﬁcantly. The spread and appeal in the
CAC of the pre-AKP era secular and modernizing “Turkish model” has been 
undeniable. Although we lack concrete indicators to measure the extent of this
inﬂuence,42 Turkey’s oﬃcial religious outreach through the Diyanet has facilitated
the shift in attitudes. Even in countries where these activities were stopped, such
as Uzbekistan, Turkish secular republican ideas are today stronger in the CAC
than they perhaps are in the AKP’s Turkey. 
Turkey’s greatest inﬂuence in the CAC has come not from its oﬃcial efforts,
but through nongovernmental religious actors. The Hizmet movement’s impact
on the future of Central Asian society is not easy to deﬁne. For one thing, the
movement’s followers represent only a small portion of the population. Their ed-
ucational networks, however, are extensive. Furthermore, their students largely
come from the elite strata of society. Therefore, the Hizmet movement’s impact on
Central Asian society, and particularly on the rising generation of elites, is none -
theless noteworthy. For these reasons, the inﬂuence of the movement in the CAC
region is likely to continue to grow in the future. 
Islam as promoted by Gülen is a synthesis of mystical Islam, Turkish nation-
alism, modern humanism, and civic service. But it is not clear whether the move-
ment’s inﬂuence can even be characterized as “religious,” or for that matter, as
Islamist. Gülen schools have likely trained thousands of students in the CAC 
region. Some of these graduates have begun to occupy important positions in 
government, academia and the private sector. The ﬁrst signs of their impact on
the younger generation do not demonstrate a fundamentally Islamic inﬂuence.
All of this begs the question: what kind of inﬂuence is the Hizmet movement hav-
ing on the future of Central Asia? Such a question is especially diﬃcult to answer
because we do not yet have a sociological proﬁle of a representative sample of
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Hizmet graduates. Research into these subjects has only just begun; however,
some tentative answers are worth considering. 
First, the vast majority of Hizmet school graduates go to the best universities in
their country and abroad. At the end of their studies they often get prestigious 
jobs in various ﬁelds of government, academia and the private sector. They are
found in varying degrees of administration, and as diplomatic representatives of
their countries abroad. Second, many graduates of these schools are distinguished
by their secular outlooks. In most cases, they are socially conservative, but religion
is not fundamental to their everyday concerns and does not affect their profes-
sional lives. In other words, students who graduated from these programs can be
religiously conservative but also very secular and modern in their outlooks.
Through discussions with dozens of graduates of Gülen schools in Central
Asia, Europe, the United States, Japan and India, I have observed that they have
tended to demonstrate a uniform set of characteristics. As a group, these people
are well-educated and well-integrated in their society; they have good jobs and
they are generally cosmopolitan in their outlook. Their religious attitudes and
practices, however, are considerably diverse. Some of them pray regularly, while
others never pray. Some of them drink alcohol. In this way, the movement’s re-
sem blance to the Jesuit movement really is striking. In both cases, a network 
of educational institutions has been put in place by a religious order; however, 
the future of the educational system does not depend on the religiosity of its 
graduates.43 Both movements strive to be holistic and to create a new religious
community that emphasizes fellowship without destroying the individuality of 
its participants. 
Outside of education, the Hizmet movement has also had a substantial econo -
mic impact in the post-Soviet CAC region. The many Hizmet-aﬃliated small- and
medium-sized Turkish companies in the CAC are both a driver and a product of
Turkish capitalism. Today, Turkey’s economic inﬂuence in the region is greater
than its political inﬂuence, and the regional spread of Hizmet schools and 
enterprises has actually contributed to the ongoing reform of the post-Soviet 
economic order. In the future, these civic and business associations will likely 
continue to counteract statist economic policies, not least because the Hizmet
movement depends on the survival of these private enterprises. Over the longer
term, therefore, it is possible that the movement’s activities in business, media, ed-
ucation and various other civic initiatives could contribute to the development of
civil society in the CAC. Religious movements played an indispensable role in the
evolution of civil society and, by extension, to secular democracy in the West: 
Islamic movements like Hizmet could plausibly do the same in the CAC. 
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Despite the prestige of Hizmet schools in the CAC, the movement has also
aroused suspicion in the region that they are harboring a political agenda. In 
recent years, distrust of the movement has grown substantially, and these per-
ceptions are likely fueled by the persistence of an anti-Islamic “Soviet mentality.”
More importantly, regional suspicions of Turkish religious outreach have prob a-
bly had less to do with the Hizmet movement’s actual activities than with politi-
cal developments in Turkey and what many regard as the country’s steady turn
toward Islamism. The rise to power of the Islamist-oriented AKP since 2002
would not have been possible without the Hizmet movement. Consequently,
many in the CAC have begun to worry that the movement is pursuing an Islamist
agenda in their own countries. 
The eruption at the end of 2013 of a still ongoing political feud inside the AKP
between elements aligned with Erdoğan and others aligned with Gülen has rein-
forced suspicions in the Caucasus and Central Asia that the movement does, in
fact, have a political agenda. It is likely, moreover, that this “open war” inside the
AKP will continue; Erdoğan’s faction does not want to share its power, and Gülen
knows that if Erdoğan succeeds in establishing the state’s control over his move-
ment's private schools in Turkey that his movement will face an existential threat.
Insofar as the struggle inside Turkey persists, it will likely not remain conﬁned to
Turkey. The rise of the AKP marked the start of a “Golden Age” for the spread of
the Hizmet movement internationally, and the movement had beneﬁted from the
support of the friendly government in Ankara. But it now appears that the move-
ment and Erdoğan are on different trajectories. As divisions within the AKP
worsen, Erdoğan may also seek to punish the Hizmet movement in other coun-
tries. If, however, the Hizmet movement continues to emerge as allies of Turkey’s
secular and democratic political opposition to Erdoğan, then governments in the
CAC will likely become less fearful that the movement has an Islamist agenda.  
When Turkish leaders decided in 1991 to utilize religion in their outreach to
the greater Turkish world, their core intentions were to expand their geopolitical
inﬂuence. After twenty years of multi-leveled cooperation between Turkey and
the Central Asian and Caucasian republics, Turkish outreach has been most suc-
cessful in the religious and cultural sphere. The new middle classes of the CAC
that have been educated by the Diyanet and especially through Hizmet schools 
“à la Turque” represent a clear success in the implementation of Turkish soft
power. These new middle classes have already played an important role in facili-
tating greater connections between Turkey and the CAC in the realms of busi-
ness, language, and civil society. It is safe to assume these connections formed by
this religious outreach will be critical to the future development of the concept of
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a greater “Turkish world.” It is, moreover, ironic when we consider that Turkey’s
religious outreach has helped to promote a more open economic order and cosmo -
politan outlook in the CAC, all while Turkey under the AKP government has 
become more internationally isolated because of its own ideological agendas. 
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